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South Asian Nationalisms
Concluding Reflections
In this concluding commentary, the overall theme of the special issue as well 
as the collective contribution of the individual articles are addressed and 
elaborated upon. In particular, it focuses on the manifold commonalities that 
exist between South Asian states—both in terms of shared traits or dynamics 
and the recurrent attribution of negative connotations to neighboring states—
and how these impact on nation-building and the possibility of actuating more 
peaceable state relations in the region. By extension, this concluding article 
argues that while enquiring into contemporary South Asian nationalisms there 
is a need to not only map the particularities of individual attempts at making 
the nation complete and integral. It is equally crucial to pose and try to answer 
questions about the limits of political community as grounded in shared 
nationhood—especially in a region concurrently marked by majoritarianism, 
cross-border affinities, and transnational patterns of community-making.
Keywords: majoritarianism—nationalism—regional cooperation—South Asia—
transnationalism
228 | Asian Ethnology Volume 80, Number 1 • 2021
One question that is worthwhile to ask at the end of the special issue is what we would gain from a comparative rather than an isolationist or insular approach to 
South Asian nationalisms. On the one hand, each national context is evidently highly 
distinct; yet, on the other hand, there are such a high number of commonalities 
between cases and shared regional patterns that it would be a missed opportunity 
not to reflect on what these similarities and congruent traits tell us about South Asian 
expressions of nationalism. However, drawing out such shared lessons on the basis 
of the special issue is not an easy task, given that the individual articles do not start 
from the same theory, method, problem, and so on. Cohesion needs to be largely 
construed and imposed, rather than neatly derived from the individual contributions. 
The articles, hence, do not extensively reflect either on the comparative qualities 
of the neighboring states nor on the possibility of utilizing South Asia as a tenable 
regional delimitation and scope in the first place. That is, what traits of uniformity 
and coherence do we attribute to South Asia, and, can South Asia be assumed to 
constitute an integrated whole or do we need to posit the question of its unity more 
explicitly? Even though the commonalities across states and the cohesiveness of the 
region are implicitly part of all of the articles in this special issue, there is, thus, a 
need to enquire more immediately into these matters.
Regional commonalities
In terms of commonalities, I note as a basic starting point, with Katharine Adeney, 
that majoritarian nationalism is gaining in prominence in the region (2015), with 
India since the last general election as the most obvious example. The term is 
associated with “majoritarianism, the demonisation of certain groups within the 
political discourse of the state and the lack of access to effective power” for minority 
communities (ibid., 7). In Mara Malagodi’s article included in this special issue, we 
encounter two ways of further nuancing the context in which such majoritarianism is 
on the rise as well as its manifest objectives. First, her observation that contemporary 
Nepal and India are both marked by a “historical context of deep pluralism and 
politicized identities” is applicable to most other South Asian states, with the 
possible exception of the Maldives and Bhutan. Second, across South Asia, we find 
“increasingly violent attempts to impose a nation-wide uniform, majoritarian, 
hegemonic, and communal ideology on those who do not subscribe to it.”
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The latter is evidently not entirely novel. On the contrary, what Malagodi points 
to might even be considered close to requisite dynamics of postcolonial statehood 
in the region, if we conceive of a need to project a unified and singular notion of 
the nation as part of the very transition from a regional order dictated by imperial 
rule to one dominated by nation states. The endeavor to decide on how to demarcate 
“the people” and to establish criteria for membership has indeed often turned into 
a violent undertaking with long-term consequences for the place of minorities in or 
vis-à-vis such a singular envisioning of the nation—irrespective of whether nation-
building has been carried out in the name of religious or secular aspirations. In 
his contribution to this special issue, Peter van der Veer, for instance, asks, “if the 
Indian sovereign nation has its roots in violence against Muslims, what is the place 
of secularism?” The present politics surrounding the National Register of Citizens in 
Assam, according to which close to two million people will be deemed unentitled to 
Indian citizenship, is a testament to the continuing centrality of minorities and their 
alleged links to neighboring states in attempts to project the nation as whole and 
complete. It is also an evident case of a global trend where contestations surrounding 
claims to citizenship—if thought of as “the materialization of sovereignty”—often are 
dealt with through a conception of law that “epistemically privileges state archives 
and identity papers over information gleaned from more immediate, concrete 
memories and relations” (see Stevens 2017, 219).
Malagodi’s second claim, nonetheless, rightly acknowledges and brings attention 
to how present calls for uniform conceptions of nationhood seem increasingly 
incompatible with notions of “unity in diversity” within individual states (for more 
on this relating to Bangladesh, see Frank J. Korom’s contribution to this special issue) 
and with a recognition, or at least a pragmatic acceptance, of the many transnational 
patterns of collective identities that exist in the region. Such transnational affinities 
are not, as twentieth-century and present-day South Asia demonstrate, easily 
reducible to state-centric views of political community and citizenship, and they 
remain near-impossible to “make manageable” or bring to an end without the 
deployment of violent and repressive means.
An alternative way of conceiving individual cases as comparable beyond pointing 
to a set inventory of concrete similarities—either the ones already mentioned or such 
things as dynasticism, the criminalization of politics, and the highly pronounced fear 
of balkanization and of “small numbers,” to use Arjun Appadurai’s term (2006)—would 
be to stress the role neighboring states fill as constitutive and contrasting outsides. 
That is, as tropes of undesirable behavior, inverted mirror images, and significant 
others. In some instances, neighboring states are even imbued with the connotation 
of having been responsible for or participants in the original and founding violence. 
This is how Pakistan and India, for example, depict one another, and it is also the 
significance attributed to Pakistan in the case of Bangladesh (for details on the 
latter, see Korom’s article included herein). Another common imagery is that of 
neighboring states as engaged in conscious attempts to incite and fuel internal 
disorder and subversion by way of training, funding, and supporting sub-nationalist 
movements or extremist organizations. South Asian states are, in general, highly 
suspicious of “neighborly transgression” and acts that seem to represent a violation 
230 | Asian Ethnology 80/1 • 2021
of the idea of nonintervention in domestic affairs, which, among other things, has 
the consequence of limiting possibilities for engaging in regional cooperation. An apt 
illustration is available in Boris Wille’s article included here on the Maldives, in which 
Pakistan, as part of a SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) 
summit held in November 2011, contributed a commemorative monument that, 
contrary to the original intention, was perceived by the Defend Islam campaign to be 
a case of “idolatry.” As an example, it is especially noteworthy since it confirms how 
neighboring states are often perceived foremost negatively even when, as in the case 
of the Maldives, “a significant other religious [national] community is absent.”
The negative attributes that are ascribed to neighboring states do not only tell us 
something significant about the particular nationalisms that operate in distinct state 
settings, they also allow us to reflect on the viability of more peaceable state relations. 
South Asia is, more than most regions, marked by entrenched state conflicts and, as 
noted, a lack of regional cooperation. There is, as Jürgen Schaflechner maintains, a 
lot of “mutual vilification” taking place between distinct South Asian nationalisms—
in his own case between Pakistan and India, by way of how religious minorities 
are represented in popular culture. At times it goes to the extent that neighboring 
citizenries and internal minorities associated with these equal an “abject” in relation 
to which conceptions of nationhood assume a sense of completion, continuity, and 
actuality. Given what the idea of abjection signifies in terms of rejection, fundamental 
negation, and misrecognition (for more on this, see Kinnvall and Svensson 2018), 
Schaflechner’s analysis and the broader lessons drawn from it do not bode well for the 
progression toward mutual understanding, rather than mutual vilification. The latter 
is particularly worrying given that the material Schaflechner focuses on, that is, the 
“contribution of vernacular popular culture [to] solidifying [stereotypes],” stands out 
as a core constituent of what Michael Billig would designate “banal nationalism” (1995), 
the quotidian inculcation and reproduction of a sense of shared national identity.
Schaflechner’s article convincingly conveys how ostensibly insignificant and 
pulp stories have the effect of disseminating and reinforcing ideas about “the 
incommensurability of Hindus and Muslims,” even to the degree of turning 
“Pakistan’s horror genre” into “a suitable stage for representing [an] ambivalent and 
frightening relationship of ‘the Hindu’ to and with Pakistan’s founding ideology.” In 
Korom’s article here, we find an analogous instance of “banal” nationalism, and a 
related display of incommensurability, in the form of a rickshaw panel that “depicts 
a woman hiding in the jungle to protect her innocent child from the onslaught and 
ravages of the Pakistani army during the war for liberation.” As Korom (this volume) 
germanely notes, “every ride . . . becomes a poignant reminder of the horrors 
encountered during the struggle for freedom.”
In our collective renderings of South Asian nationalisms, it is the exact significance 
of this very domain of nation-building that we are yet to fully study—and which many 
of the articles in this special issue are a great step toward. What, in other words, are 
the micropolitics and the everyday agency that uphold and inform state relations 
and state activities relating to sovereignty claims and status seeking (for more on 
this need in general, see Björkdahl, Hall, and Svensson 2019)? How do we successfully 
commit to analyses that integrate and reconcile the very lived experiences of 
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individuals and collectives and the large-scale processes that drive majoritarian 
nationalism and state rivalry in the region? In the case of Hindu nationalism in India, 
we, for example, seem to have a reasonable grasp of its ideological foundation, the 
appeal of the BJP as a political party and how it compares with other similar parties 
globally, the type of leadership Narendra Modi represents, and so forth. There is, 
however, a need for even more empirically oriented work when it comes to the ways 
in which these factors resonate with and are shaped by ordinary “people’s ongoing 
work in the making of lifeworlds” (on the latter, see Mannergren Selimovic 2019).
In the face of the already mentioned everyday reproduction of incommensura-
bility, which is underpinned by rigid and potent stereotypes that are applied to those 
who are either seen as equaling internal or external abject others, and at times to 
those who are perceived as occupying a liminal space that traverses both of these, 
it is exceedingly hard to conceive of state interactions and majority-minority 
classifications and relations in positive terms. It is undeniable that South Asian 
nationalisms, if placed in a regional and comparative frame, in many ways act as an 
everyday molding of distinct, discrete, and often irreconcilable ideas of the nation 
and nationhood. This holds true both for what is conventionally designated religious 
and secular nationalism. While the latter remains more open to diversity within each 
state, it remains closed to the transcending possibilities of community-making that is 
not foremost or exclusively bound to state-centric territoriality.
Let us here take the recently opened Partition Museum in Amritsar as our 
example. Even though the museum—which describes itself as a “people’s museum” 
with a specific focus on the experiences of migrants and survivors of the Partition 
violence—amounts to a clear effort to critically inform and educate visitors about the 
event as a dark or dissonant heritage that is shared equally between India, Pakistan, 
and today’s Bangladesh, it deliberately refrains from framing its content in relation 
to contemporary South Asia. Put differently, while the museum traces the long-term 
legacies of the Partition on the individual and community levels, it stays silent on 
how the event relates to and continues to impact on present-day state relations 
and expressions of majoritarian nationalism in the region. By extension, it does not 
then ask important questions concerning the frail underpinnings of state-promoted 
nationalisms and the manifold sub-national affinities that exist or have existed across 
current state borders. The museum, then, like many of the articles that make up this 
special issue, does not take seriously the question of what, if anything, to speak with 
van der Veer, “transcends the nation.” In the particular case of the Partition Museum 
it is reflected in an unwillingness to fully address the question of what it might 
mean to undo the Partition, whereas in this special issue it surfaces in the form of an 
acceptance of the givenness and assumed rigidity of individual nation state projects. 
This is the issue that I turn to next.
The nation’s transcendence or transcending the nation?
As mentioned, in his article included here, van der Veer articulates the important 
query of “what transcends the nation,” to which he then adds the response, “nothing, 
perhaps, since the nation itself is transcendental.” However, if he is right, it is surely 
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a very limited and limiting transcendental quality that we are able to attribute to 
the nation. It means that we—consonant with modernist accounts of nationalism 
as, on the one hand, a means for making sense of the ways in which the modern 
state induced new conceptions and sensations of time and space and, on the other 
hand, an instrument for superseding local and traditional forms of identification—
view the nation as a vehicle for turning distant relations into kinship-like affinities, 
even across and beyond different generations. Accordingly, the nation both acts 
as a vessel for and propels collective agency—an agency, if we accept Jacqueline 
Stevens’s account (2009), that is not only intimately linked to the active preservation 
of membership as foremost inherited, but also is recurrently the root cause of large-
scale conflict, violence, and suffering. It is, thus, easy to concur with van der Veer’s 
critique of the portrayal of nationalism as principally “immanent and secular” and as 
foremost connected to “the collective will of autonomous, rational subjects.” It has—
as he brings attention to—since its very inception as a mode of political mobilization 
been entwined with affect and the emotive positing of the nation’s calling or destiny. 
In other words, the “enchanted world” never went away (see also Closs Stephens 
2014, 41–42).
If we build on this recognition of the entanglements of nation as community and 
affective states, it might—as attended to in the final part of this article—offer us 
important clues to the appeal of religious nationalism in South Asia. What it does not 
do, however, is impel or force us to see how the nation as such might be transcended, 
which is an urgent issue considering how presently hegemonic conceptions of South 
Asian nations are worryingly minimalistic in the transcendence that they offer. 
While the articles in this special issue provide many and good answers to the question 
“where is the nation,” they do not sufficiently address the equally imperative query 
concerning “why the nation” in the first place.
In a regional context such as South Asia where there are myriad examples of 
how the nation state adopts colonizing, imperial, and marginalizing expressions, it 
would be a mistake not to consider the alternatives that might exist if we were to 
transgress, transcend, or deny the primacy of extant forms of nationalism. While 
it might be pertinent to ascribe certain transcendent abilities to Hindutva notions 
of a Hindu rāṣṭra (for details, see Khan et al. 2017), most would surely be inclined to 
rather accentuate the many exclusions and demotions that they effectuate. After 
all, each articulation of a unifying idea of the nation—as even Mari Miyamoto and 
colleagues’ case study of Bhutan in this special issue attests to—concurrently works 
to forcefully accommodate or overwrite pluralist and syncretic practices and 
cultural expressions. In Bhutan, there is, for instance, a clear drive toward replacing 
animistic practices with Buddhist rituals, as they demonstrate. A crucial point of 
the analysis of changing practices relating to meat consumption and slaughter 
of animals in Bhutan is that promoting “Buddhist doctrine” is entirely compatible 
with “the notion of the modern nation state.” It is not an unexpected finding, 
however, if we take the entire special issue into account: religion effectively affords 
the modern nation state the enchanted qualities it otherwise finds hard to exhibit.
Given the nation’s ability to reduce multiplicity and to align such a reduction with 
ideas of state territoriality, van der Veer appears to be correct while insisting that the 
SvenSSon: SouTh aSian naTionaliSmS | 233
apt answer to the question of what transcends the nation is nothing. With Angharad 
Closs Stephens, it might even be argued that there is no way out of the nation as “form” 
at present; that is, as the principal form of structure to assume and conform to for any 
political community that desires to be sovereign and to exercise self-determination, 
articulate legitimate claims to a delimited territory, and claim to be able to represent 
the will of its members (2014; see also Balibar 2004; Samaddar 2012). A manifest 
example of the present limits of transnational social formations is the commitment 
by Dalit activists to build and act on solidarity across nation state borders in their 
efforts to counter caste-based discrimination. Even though Dalit activists across the 
region increasingly base their work on the insight that caste is not exclusive to India 
or to Hindu communities and that external pressure, built through a global layer of 
activism, is needed to make sure that individual states commit to the eradication 
of casteist practices, it has proven very hard to turn the struggle against caste-
based discrimination into a regional or international, rather than a domestic, issue.
Nevertheless, what we risk forgetting or blinding ourselves to if we hold on to a 
conception of the nation form as impossible to transcend is that it has a clear history—
or many concrete histories, to be precise. It is not given or predetermined as the 
only way to conceive of political unity and community; and we should not, of course, 
forget that until the actual establishment of India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (then 
Ceylon) as independent nation states in the late 1940s, it was imperial relations that 
dominated much of the region. Hence, instead of a direct correspondence between 
the yearnings for nationhood and territorial statehood, notions of paramountcy, 
overlapping authority claims, and divisible sovereignty prevailed. There is, in 
addition, an undeniably transnational dimension to anti-imperial and postcolonial 
nationalism that we need to consider. Much of the inspiration of individual instances 
of postcolonial nationalism was not specific to the context in which it was achieved. 
If viewed in this light, it should be possible to critically ponder the historicity, and 
thus the particularity and chance character, of the sense of sameness and shared 
community that is supposed to underpin present-day nation-building efforts. The 
nation as the principal mode of enacting and envisioning community is, hence, 
clearly not unique in a transhistorical sense, and it is not unique nor does it hold the 
status of exclusivity in the lives of many people now living in South Asia.
Yet if it is not principally a European construct, diffused and globalized through 
acts of mimicry and emulation, what then is the nation in a South Asian context; and 
what makes it so hard—even in a South Asian setting—to ask about the potential to 
transcend, replace, or make redundant nation as form? It is not, as the articles in 
this special issue show, a direct consequence of a neat entwinement or coherence 
of nationality and territoriality. Nation as form is, however, as we know, predicated 
upon identifying sameness and difference; and although it is ill-suited to name this 
sameness in concrete and conclusive terms, it is well-suited for sorting out difference, 
for marking and distinguishing distance, estrangement, and subordination. Nation as 
form in its present guise in South Asia, like everywhere else, effectively establishes 
distance between neighboring states, draws distinctions between majorities and 
minorities, and hierarchizes societies domestically.
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There is, of course, also an international dimension at work here. Even though 
there has been a momentous expansion of the global layer of political and social 
life, international order—if read through the lens of international law—clearly 
places an expectation on states to prove and exhibit a congruence of territoriality 
and nationality in order to be recognized as sovereign units with the right to 
self-determination. As Jens Bartelson stresses in an ongoing project on the long 
nineteenth century and the transition from empires to states as the dominant units 
of the international system, it is a congruence that is not given, however (Bartelson 
2018). It was, as he argues, conceptualized into being during the nineteenth century 
and accordingly acted upon by influential elites and broader populations alike. The 
lesson to be drawn for South Asia is that we—while considering the often taken-
for-granted nexus of nationality, territoriality, and community—always need to be 
attentive to the particular histories out of which present South Asian nation states 
emerged. In India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, for example, there was no immediately 
corresponding unified state prior to 1947 and then 1971. South Asia under British 
imperial rule consisted of a combination of direct and indirect rule, which meant that 
large parts of the region continued to exist as “princely states” until decolonization.
It has, moreover, always been the case that South Asian states find it very difficult 
to attain the aforementioned congruence, and many would argue that it is the very 
impossibility of achieving a concurrence between community and territoriality, and 
to, thereby, effectuate real and proper popular sovereignty, that is the cause of most 
internal and external conflicts. Pakistan is perhaps the most obvious case, signified 
by, first, its partitioning in 1971 that led to the undermining of the nation’s supposed 
religious underpinning and, second, by the vague sense of and commitment to 
Pakistani nationhood in many border areas—but the same argument applies to India, 
Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan (not included in this special issue). It is 
also, one might argue, what manifests itself in the embodiment of the nation, and the 
embodiment of resistance to it, which Susan A. Reed writes about in her contribution 
to this special issue. Through her analysis, we both come to reflect on the crucial 
question of how the nation might be embodied in more inclusive and desirable 
ways, and come to realize that the analyzed performance revolves around the very 
tension put in place by a lack of equivalence between community and territoriality. 
The latter, as Reed expounds, does not simply lead to exclusionary practices enacted 
toward “outsiders” or what is perceived to be lesser members, it also entails and 
reproduces gendered asymmetries and clearly assigned roles and responsibilities 
within the assumed boundaries of the nation.
What this affords us then is a picture of the nation as always-already transcended 
or, portrayed differently, hollowed out from within. It remains incomplete. There 
are those on the inside—those recognized as members—who feel estranged; it is 
always, even on the most willing members, to some extent imposed and decided upon 
by someone else (see Nancy 1991). There are, in addition, a host of liminal subject 
positions that keep on haunting it. Some examples of this would be the supposed 
anachronisms of Biharis in Bangladesh, pastoralists in Bhutan, and Hindus in 
Pakistan. It then seems as if the “daily plebiscite” (to echo van der Veer) aimed at 
affirming the nation is, at the same time, a recurring confirmation of its deficiencies 
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and limitations. South Asian nationalisms, as the individual contributions have 
demonstrated, are a great and perceptible example of this, as they do not allow for 
settled and totalizing views of the nation. It is therefore imperative to attend to 
why the present moment, despite this, equals a seemingly crucial juncture for the 
congealing and success of religious nationalism in the region.
The concurrent prevalence of religious nationalism 
and nation-building as “empire-making”
It needs to be acknowledged that religious nationalism is what dominates the 
field of available projections and manifestations of the nation as a basis for 
political community in a contemporary South Asian context; and, as argued, there 
is an apparent trend in the region as a whole to turn to majoritarianism and, as a 
consequence, to demote and heavily police and limit valuations of minority claims 
and the slogan “unity in diversity,” as indicated by Korom and Jan Magnusson in the 
introduction to this collection of articles. The present significance of these aspects 
is confirmed and elaborated upon in all of the articles included herein. With van der 
Veer it is, then, possible to claim that what we bear witness to on a regional scale 
is how “religious divisions” are “reinforced through political mobilization,” and 
very deliberately so. Wille is, consequently, right when asserting that we need to 
pay attention not only to the ideological content and societal resonance of specific 
religious nationalisms but also to “the religious commitment of the state, which 
captures the ways the state engages in managing, maintaining, and monitoring 
religious nationalism.” Two important questions that he asks pertain to the role of 
states in fostering and upholding limited access to communities and individuals not 
subscribing to the, at present, dominant form of religious nationalism; that is, “what 
work do states do to forge or disentangle religion and nationalism” and “how do 
states mediate between religious and other normative orders”?
If we, for instance, used to be able to speak of a specific Indian brand of secularism, 
today we need to admit that the Indian state is committed to advancing a highly 
particular interpretation of Hinduism and, by extension, of what it means to be Indian. 
It is clear—whether we think of Jammu and Kashmir’s recently reconceptualized 
status, the governing of the Ganges, the writing of history books, and the steering 
of higher education in general, and so on—that many of the Indian state’s actions 
at present align with an envisioning of India as a Hindu nation state. In his article 
on Bangladesh, Korom observes a very different content to how the state manages, 
maintains, and monitors religious nationalism. He writes that, “by visibly projecting 
an image of the country as celebratory, happy, peaceful, and, most importantly, 
secular, Bangladesh continuously attempts to manage its religious, linguistic, and 
ethnic diversity through large-scale public displays of nationalism.” Although Korom 
here portrays religious nationalism as being held at bay through “large-scale public 
displays of nationalism” with inclusive characteristics, the depiction also implies 
that more particular and restrictive versions of nationalism always, to some extent, 
threaten the maintenance of such a secular envisioning of the nation.
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If we are to build on this reasoning, two readily detectable explanations for the 
intensified turn to religious nationalism and majoritarianism are available. The first 
emphasizes historical developments and a certain path dependency arising from 
these: either in the form of an original synthesis between majority religion and 
nationhood, as in the case of Pakistan, or in the form of an imagery of fundamental 
desires that were suppressed at the time of the founding moment (that is, at the 
time of decolonization) that are now resurfacing, such as in the case of the ban of 
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in the late 1940s. The second explanation 
(which is fully reconcilable with the first) would instead foremost stress how a more 
integrated world has—somewhat paradoxically at first sight—led to inward-looking 
needs and propensities, and how perceived uncertainties of significant groups 
in society result in a loss of what Anthony Giddens and others have referred to as 
“ontological security” (for more on this, see Kinnvall and Mitzen 2017). This, in turn, 
leads to an ensuing need to “regain” or “restore” a sense of stability, continuity, and 
predictability. However, this search for completion through “restoration,” as well 
as the aforementioned “fear of small numbers” (Appadurai 2006), is—as scholars of 
South Asia very well know—not new. Simply think of the communal violence that 
India has periodically suffered since its inception as a postcolonial state in 1947 or 
the treatment of the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan. In the present special issue, 
Schaflechner’s study of how the Hindu minority is rendered in Pakistani popular 
culture is another example of this. South Asia should, thus, not only make us attuned 
to how territoriality, nationality, political authority, and political community never 
fully coincide but also make us wary of those who claim to be able to make such an 
overlap possible.
This brings forth two additional insights: first, that there will always be 
mobilization attending to this intrinsic mismatch and, second, that the nation is 
never ubiquitous, omnipresent, and totalizing. The first point appears, then, to put 
us in partial opposition to Korom’s more limited view of what counts as violent 
expressions of nationalism. In his contribution on Bangladesh to this volume, he 
writes that “when . . . displays of nationalistic unity fail, violence results, which 
challenges the notion of the nation’s unity and harmony.” In the construal advanced 
here, violence is instead seen as an ever-present facet of the endeavor to achieve 
or display “nationalistic unity.” It then seems that, particularly in a South Asian 
context, an overly benign faith in the possibility of separating “peaceful, celebratory 
modes of nationalistic performance” from their antonym makes us less sensitized to 
the experiences of marginal communities and individuals than we ought to be. As 
Magnusson evinces through his article on the Baltis of Pakistan, there are numerous 
border regions beyond the effective exercise of sovereign control and legibility, and 
the same might be said about many urban and rural areas not located along state 
borders. There are, in other words, a multitude of communities that exist on the 
margins of or even “outside the nation state framework,” to echo Magnusson in this 
volume, as well as a lot of liminal spaces occupied by communities that display a 
transnational expansion across state borders.
Although the overall focus of this special issue has been on South Asian 
nationalisms, in conclusion it remains possible to enquire about the extent to which 
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what we see foremost resembles nation-building practices, or if it is more aptly 
conceptualized in terms of a continuation of empire by other means. This reflection 
does not solely apply to internal colonialism in the form of state attempts to, on the 
one hand, reshape and mold what citizens relate to as shared cultural traits and to, 
on the other hand, gather and classify knowledge about all inhabitants and their 
place within a conjectured whole. It represents a broader and genuine concern about 
the long life and lingering relevance of imperial notions of governance and political 
authority that initially emerged as part of British rule. Do we, in other words, still 
find traces of ideas about paramountcy and of the ways in which direct and indirect 
rule were varyingly practiced in different parts of South Asia? The answer, at least in 
the case of India and Pakistan, is yes.
In his article, Magnusson, for example, attends to how Baltistan in both India and 
Pakistan “became an object of internal colonialism and state- and nation-making, 
[and] part of a new geography with a new geopolitical agenda.” Hence, “for the Balti 
community, Independence, Partition, [and] division [in 1947] meant the transition 
from one mode of colonial domination and subalternity to another” (this volume). If 
there is a need for enhanced and further knowledge about the population, the nation 
state, as Magnusson contends, foremost exists for administrative purposes, with the 
core undertaking being “to bring the communities living in [inaccessible] areas under 
administration, incorporate them into the national economy, and tax them.” Next 
to majoritarian nationalism there is, thus, if we concur with Magnusson, a parallel 
and intersecting postcolonial colonialism at work. In Magnusson’s article, this is, 
with James C. Scott, recognized “as a massive reduction of vernaculars of all kinds.” 
In particular, he emphasizes the epistemic practices that are required “to bring the 
periphery into line.” What this suggests is that it is not sufficient to conceive of 
South Asian nationalisms solely on the basis of an attempt to differentiate between 
“religious” and “secular” nationalism, or between more or less desirable nationalism, 
without considering how all state-centric imaginings of nationhood and political 
community are committed to bringing margins and peripheries “into line.”
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